So the first thing we need to do is identify: What is the difference between an alliance and a vessel sharing agreement?

• Vessel Sharing Agreement (VSA): Member carriers simply agree to share space on each others vessels in particular trade lanes. Space is allocated to each carrier on each others vessels at an agreed upon price on specific trade lanes.
• Alliance: Member carriers agree to not only share space on each others vessels but also jointly operate and decide on major service routes, new services being introduced, transit / service levels, and capacity controls. Each member carrier agrees to contribute a certain amount of resources (vessel size and number of vessels, space on each vessel, equipment distribution, etc.)

Obviously carrier alliances are a much tighter-knit group then casual vessel sharing agreements (VSAs) and the impact of their decisions will be greater on the individual carriers and their customers than would be under a VSA. The next question: who are these alliances / VSAs and which carriers belong to them? Based on current information (December 2011) here is a list of the various carrier alliances and vessel sharing agreements in the Trans-Pacific market:

New World Alliance: APL, Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM), and MOL (Mitsui OSK Lines)

To the best of my knowledge, the dominant member and largest contributor to the alliance is APL. MOL is the smallest carrier of the three but offers some of the fastest and most direct services from Asia that the other two piggy-back on. APL has, in my opinion, the best network and fastest connections from Southeast Asia. From my personal experience, the New World Alliance has the fastest transits from Asia to the West Coast.

Grand Alliance: Hapag-Lloyd, NYK Line, and OOCL

To the best of my knowledge, the largest contributor to the alliance is Hapag-Lloyd, although all 3 lines are much closer in size (from a Trans-Pacific perspective) than the New World Alliance. Strong and dependable service from the Trans-Pacific and good transits overall.

CKYH Alliance: COSCO, K-Line, Yang Ming, and Hanjin

This alliance is the easiest to remember thanks to their generic name – the first initial of each carrier makes up the alliance. To the best of my knowledge Hanjin is the largest contributor to the alliance but COSCO, Yang Ming, and Hanjin are all somewhat similar in size and each has their unique strengths and weaknesses depending on the trade lane. From a financial standpoint, probably the riskiest alliance based on the individual carriers’ Financial Z-Score, a financial benchmark developed by Drewry. With the exception of K-Line all of the alliance members are in the Z-Score distress zone with Yang Ming and Hanjin near the bottom of the zone with low scores. I should note this is based on data on/about September 2011 and is obviously subject to change. And I am sure the individual carriers involved would dispute some of the figures used going into that Z-Score.

All that being said, the CKYH is a big alliance and has a wide variety of Trans-Pacific services to both coasts.

VSA – Evergreen and China Shipping

The two companies share vessel space to and from China and a few other major trade lanes. Evergreen is easily the much larger of the two and with far more reliable service. Quite honestly, I do not know what Evergreen’s benefit in this is, while China Shipping gets to market reliable Evergreen service with China Shipping rates.

VSA – CMA-CGM, Maersk Line, and MSC

The three largest carriers in the world in terms of global capacity, and also, ironically enough, all of European origins, this VSA has the largest capacity and import volume into the United States from Asia. That being said, they also tend to have longer transits to the East Coast than average and MSC lacks 45′ high cube containers. They also tend, in my experience, to be a bit more bureaucratic and sometimes difficult to deal with. However, they have a lot of capacity to share with each other and hence can often provide space and rates that people need.

These 3 carrier alliances and 2 VSAs cover over 80% of the import container volume coming into the U.S. As a general rule, you can worry about VSAs less than Alliances.

With alliances, they can, and will, withdraw services as an entire group, completely ending a specific trade lane to a specific U.S. port. Now if you do all of your importing into Long Beach / Los Angeles, or possibly New York for those of you on the East Coast, you probably have little to nothing to worry about. But any other port in the U.S. – Oakland, Sea/Tac, Savannah, Charleston, or any inland inter-modal, etc. – and you should be aware that the possibility of one of the alliances ending, temporarily or permanently, services to your port / CY from one or more of your origins is possible. One company I knew had contracts with Hapag, NYK, and OOCL back in 2009 into Oakland only to be completely screwed when the Grand Alliance made a decision to completely stop calling Oakland out of Shanghai. Did they diversify their carrier base? Absolutely. But they made the mistake of unintentionally choosing carriers who all cooperate with each other in the same alliance.

Now, if your volumes are somewhat small and your origin lanes limited. this may not be a concern; you’d actually be doing yourself a disservice from a relationship and rate perspective to try and split up your cargo amongst too many carriers. However, for any large import shippers out there with multiple carriers and significant volume from key lanes, you absolutely should consider carrier alliances when making carrier decisions.

For example, if Yantian to Seattle and Savannah are two of your top lanes and you have a choice between 3 carriers, all within $100 in price of each other, but two of them belong to one alliance and one of them belongs to another, you’d be better off splitting some of your volume to the carrier in another alliance rather than assigning it all to one carrier or to all the same carriers in alliance.

Another thing you could do would be to allocate to the best value carrier but make sure you give some other origins to another carrier in another alliance whom you can rely upon as a backup should the other carrier alliance make decisions that would affect your business.

My general rule of thumb, if you have the volume, is to make sure you have contracts with carriers from at least two different alliances and one of the VSAs. Not only that but, if possible, try not to commit too much volume to one alliance or VSA over the other. That’s not always possible, but to the best of your ability you don’t want to do that. It’s difficult to count on a backup carrier to suddenly absorb a huge increase in volume when you only have a small MQC committed to in the contract.

For my company’s current contracts I think we fared very well from this standpoint, which we weren’t always able to do in the past because the numbers were not economically feasible. We have at least one carrier from each of the 3 alliances and 2 VSAs. So from a network coverage we truly have all our bases covered from a diversification standpoint. However, two of the carriers are small contracts so if we do run into trouble with the others and need to call on them to pick up the slack, we could have a problem. But with such a diversified carrier base the risk of that is very low.

We’ll try to keep this post updated from time to time as the Alliances and VSAs change. Bookmark this post as a handy guide to who’s-who in the Alliances and VSAs and remember to keep that in mind when negotiating with carriers and deciding which carriers you are going to do business with. Remember: you can easily diversify your carrier base and yet still put all your eggs in one risky basket if they are all of the same alliance.

Firstly, the headlines you see on Bloomberg or CNN with the ever-changing prices on crude reflect oil futures. Basically, these are mostly large financial deals in multiple contracts between buyers and sellers who agree to buy and sell a specified amount of oil at an agreed upon price at some date in the future. In most cases, no actual oil is ever delivered or processed; the transaction is simply a financial one with cash being settled at the end of the day.

Bunker fuel, on the other hand, is a derivative of crude oil. In the simplest and crudest of terms, bunker fuel is the gunk that is leftover after refineries have processed all the more valuable fuels from the crude source. It is thick and heavy and must be heated before it can be used in an engine. It is difficult to store and transport. And it is ideal for large marine going vessels that have the heavy engines and fuel capacity to handle bunker fuel. Because of this, bunker fuel is not readily available like gasoline / petrol. It is mainly stored at or near major ocean ports and primarily sold and delivered via physical contracts to marine vessel interests. Because of this, bunker fuel prices vary widely from port to port. While there certainly are bunker fuel futures they are mainly utilized by the marine community and unlike crude futures the contracts normally entail actual physical delivery of the fuel. Also, like crude, there are a number of bunker fuel price indexes that the maritime community and their financial interests use.

For the purposes of this discussion I am going to focus on the prices published by the TSA (Trans-Pacific Stabilization Agreement) Carriers and because I reside in the U.S. this will be written from a Trans-Pacific standpoint. The TSA Carriers have agreed to their own index of bunker fuel prices which is a published weekly average based on bunker fuel prices to both the U.S. West Coast and U.S. East Coast. These weekly average bunker fuel prices are available publicly at the TSA website here:

http://www.tsacarriers.org/calc_bunker.html

They then take an average of the weekly average fuel price over the entire quarter and then set the next quarter’s bunker fuel price based on that average. It is this index and formula that most carriers use when assessing quarterly BAF (fuel surcharge) charges to adjust to rising / falling bunker fuel costs.

Because the media and public knowledge are largely geared around crude oil futures and prices, this can cause a lot of confusion when supply chain / logistics managers start talking about bunker fuel and what kind of BAF (fuel surcharge) they will have to pay. It’s only natural for others to immediately switch their brains to thinking about crude prices and the headlines for that day / week and try to make a connection to what this supply chain / logistics manager is telling them about future ocean freight fuel cost increases. And it’s also only natural for many supply chain / logistics managers to try and find a link or relationship between the same headlines they see every day regarding crude prices and the BAF charges they will have to pay in the future. So this begs the question: is there a simple and direct correlation between bunker fuel prices and publicly reported crude prices? And can that correlation be used to potentially forecast or understand where bunker fuel prices might be headed in the future?

Unfortunately there is NOT a simple and direct correlation between crude oil prices and bunker fuel prices. That being said, there is a very broad figure you can use to quickly derive a rough bunker fuel price from whatever crude oil price you see published or that someone in your company questions you on. I call this number the “Bunker Fuel Multiplier” and quite simply it is just a multiple of the crude oil price. I came up with this figure because I was constantly being asked within my own company, by multiple people over multiple years, what the bunker fuel was based on that day / week / year’s crude oil price. I was also constantly asked where bunker fuel, and subsequently BAF, was going to be in the following month / quarter / year given crude oil price assumptions.

So what we did was start tracking the TSA Weekly Average Fuel Price (WAFP) going all the way back to January 2006 through today.

Starting in May 2009, the TSA adjusted their formula to establish separate pricing for West Coast vs. East Coast. Prior to May 2009 our figures reflect the old TSA formula. From May 2009 onwards we just did a simple average of the West Coast and East Coast prices to come up with a single number to match the old formula. We then also tracked the average weekly futures price for NYMEX crude as well as the weekly BRENT spot price for crude:

From there we did a simple calculation of where the bunker fuel price for that particular week compared to NYMEX and BRENT from a multiplier standpoint. This is what we found:

Over the past 5 years, Bunker Fuel has been priced at an average multiple of 5.8x the price of NYMEX and BRENT. That means that over the long run you can take the price of NYMEX or BRENT and multiply it by 5.8 to get a rough bunker fuel price. So the next time someone in your company asks “what if fuel hits USD 200 per barrel next year? what will that mean for bunker?” you can tell them that might equate to a bunker fuel price of USD 1,160 per ton (USD 200 x 5.8).

However, while this is a nice, simple, broad indicator it is very broad. As I mentioned, there is not a clear and direct link between crude oil prices and bunker fuel prices. Just look at the Bunker Fuel Multiplier chart above; within that 5-year average of 5.8 there are weeks and months – and years – where the multiplier was anywhere from 4.8 to 8.1 times the price of crude. For example, if we were to break down the Bunker Fuel Multiplier by calendar year:

2007 = 5.4

2008 = 5.3

2009 = 6.1

2010 = 5.9

2011 = 6.3

Also, for 2011 there has been a huge divergence in the bunker fuel multiplier between NYMEX and BRENT. Again, look at the above chart and notice the huge divergence between the NYMEX and BRENT. For 2011 the NYMEX multiplier is 6.8, meaning that bunker fuel has averaged 6.8x the price for NYMEX crude. But for BRENT the multiplier has been 6.3x, meaning that bunker fuel has averaged 6.3x the price for BRENT crude. The reason behind this is because in 2011, for reasons I do not know, NYMEX has been trading at a 10-20% discount over BRENT over the course of the year. Whereas prior to 2011 the two prices were nearly identical. If there was a change in how the BRENT spot price is calculated and published, I do not know it.

Because of the volatility in oil and bunker fuel prices, not to mention the variances between NYMEX and BRENT, the Bunker Fuel Multiplier can vary widely from month-to-month and year-to-year. With that in mind, I always provide a range when folks ask me where bunker fuel will be in the future based on crude oil assumptions. For example, if someone asks me where bunker fuel might be at USD 100 per barrel, I would tell them “probably in the range of USD 580-630 based on historical averages”.

So to wrap it up:

• Bunker fuel is a derivative of crude and therefore there is some correlation between crude oil prices and bunker fuel prices.
• By comparing current and long term prices of the TSA Weighted Average Bunker Fuel Price against NYMEX and BRENT crude prices we can determine a simple “bunker fuel multiplier” that makes it handy to at least come up with a rough estimate of where future bunker fuel levels will be based on any crude oil price assumption.

Why would being able to roughly forecast bunker fuel prices be useful?

• Bunker fuel is a prominent component of ocean carriers’ actual vessel operating costs.
• Base ocean container rates fluctuate based on the actual cost of bunker fuel the carrier thinks they will have to pay.
• BAF (Bunker Adjustment Factor, or fuel surcharge) charges are configured and added onto the base rate you pay for ocean freight once bunker fuel levels exceed a certain amount for that quarter.
• BAF charges are additional / on-on-top-of the base rates you will pay to carriers.
• Therefore, understanding when and how your carrier will asses quarterly BAF charges, not to mention how much they actually pay for bunker fuel configured into your base rate, allows you to actually plan and forecast for future rate increases.
  • Or to help you when putting together your freight spend budget for the next year.
  • Or to help you understand where container freight rates might be headed when it comes to negotiating new ocean carrier contracts.

For too many companies, BAF surcharges and actual bunker fuel costs are little thought of or not understood at all. Too often companies simply defer to whatever their carriers tell them and go along with whatever the consensus is. And as lengthy and technical as this post is, this is actually a very simplistic way of looking at and calculating potential future bunker fuel and BAF costs using the simple price of crude oil. There are certainly other, probably better, ways of looking at and trying to forecast future bunker fuel costs and plan for potential cost increases or decreases. Regardless, the more control you have over understanding what affects the carriers’ costs and bottom line and how those costs may or may not affect you will only help you plan better for the future, as well get a handle on your total supply chain costs. I hope my simplistic methodology can perhaps help others to think along these tracks so they can be better prepared during ocean contracts season.

Click on the image above for a larger view that you can print or download. For your easy reference, here’s a simple and quick list just by name:

Rank Airport
1 MEMPHIS (MEM)
2 HONG KONG (HKG)
3 SHANGHAI (PVG)
4 INCHEON (ICN)
5 PARIS (CDG)
6 ANCHORAGE (ANC)*
7 LOUISVILLE (SDF)
8 DUBAI (DXB)
9 FRANKFURT (FRA)
10 TOKYO (NRT)
11 SINGAPORE (SIN)
12 MIAMI (MIA)
13 LOS ANGELES (LAX)
14 BEIJING (PEK)
15 TAIPEI (TPE)
16 LONDON (LHR)
17 AMSTERDAM (AMS)
18 NEW YORK (JFK)
19 CHICAGO (ORD)
20 BANGKOK (BKK)
21 GUANGZHOU (CAN)
22 INDIANAPOLIS (IND)
23 NEWARK (EWR)
24 TOKYO (HND)
25 LUXEMBOURG (LUX)
26 OSAKA (KIX)
27 SHENZHEN (SZX)
28 KUALA LUMPUR (KUL)
29 DALLAS/FORTWORTH (DFW)
30 MUMBAI (BOM)

India’s two biggest ports, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port and Mumbai Port, conducted limited operations on Friday.
———————————————————————————–
Salvagers cleared about 60 of the 300 containers that fell off of the MSC Chitra and spilled into the main channel of Mumbai Harbor, blocking the entrance to both ports.

Vessels with a draft of less than 30 feet were being allowed to enter and leave JNPT Friday during high tide and under naval escort.

“Unless the Navy scans the channels and finds it completely clear of containers, normal operations cannot resume,” N. Maharana, operations head at Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, told Bloomberg News.

Mumbai Port has also begun limited operations, said H. Khatri, a deputy director at the government’s Directorate of Shipping, who is overseeing the clearance operations. He declined to comment on when the work may be completed.

A number of smaller draft vessels already departed yesterday and a number of similar size vessels are being allowed to call the port today. I can not comment on all the container lines that call Mumbai/JNPT, but can provide the following info on APL and Maersk, two of the carriers I use in my day job:

APL Melbourne (U.S. West Coast) – Original ETD of August 8th – vessel is at berth and awaiting permission to depart, which could happen any time.

APL Doha (U.S. West Coast) – vessel is supposedly at berth and is scheduled for August 15th departure. Some container bookings not already loaded on the APL Melbourne are being switched to this vessel.

APL Sharjah (U.S. West Coast) – vessel has been changed to APL Chicago with an ETD of August 18th.

Maersk Utah (U.S. East Coast) – Original ETD of August 12th – skipped Mumbai/JNPT completely and discharged all Mumbai/JNPT cargo in Pipavav. All cargo originally booked for this vessel is now delayed a week and will instead depart on the Maersk Missouri, ETD August 19th

Nedlloyd Hudson (U.S. West Coast) – Berthed since August 8th and awaiting permission to depart.

Nedlloyd Barentz (U.S. West Coast) – All Mumbai/JNPT cargo will instead be discharged in Pipavav. Vessel will NOT call Mumbai/JNPT so any outbound cargo booked for this vessel will instead leave a week later or more.

Both carriers are accepting bookings ex-Mumbai/JNPT, including for inland points that route through the ports. I have asked both carriers how they plan to handle and route new bookings through what will be a very backlogged and congested port. I also asked why they wouldn’t route cargo through either Mundra or Pipavav respectively until things clear up in Mumbai. So far, no reply other than they are working on getting their vessels moving as the port clears up and are looking at options.

According to Bloomberg, the government aims to have all the containers floating/sunk in the harbor cleared tomorrow. I find this hard to believe considering only 60 of the roughly 300 have been removed.

Meanwhile, MSC continues to claim the Khalijia III was at fault.

ORIGINAL STORY DATED AUGUST 10, 2010

The big news yesterday was the collision of two vessels in Mumbai harbor on Saturday, with one of the vessels involved a 2300+ TEU MSC container vessel, thereby closing the harbor to all incoming and outgoing vessel traffic. Full story here. Today it appears that local officials are planning for an August 15th reopening for both Mumbai and Jawaharlal Nehru ports. That’s a full week after the initial collision: that means a week’s backlog of vessel calls to and from the port and a massive backlog of containers currently sitting at JNPT and Mumbai. And all of this hinges on whether the local authorities can remove enough containers from the water on time and either get the MSC vessel out of the way or safely route vessels around her.

According to a report today from the JOC, MSC has recovered the “black box” from their vessel and is claiming the other vessel, the Khalijia III, is at fault:

“…the Khaligia 3, with salvors’ escort tugs in attendance, left what we believe was the Khaligia 3’s anchorage position, and crossed the fairway ahead of the MSC Chitra heading generally southbound and turning to port.

“For reasons not known to us, the Khaligia 3 unexpectedly continued turning to port, and came back to cross the fairway again, now heading in a generally northbound direction, and struck the MSC Chitra on the MSC Chitra’s port side while the MSC Chitra was still properly navigating in the main channel.”

Meanwhile, the India government is ordering salvagers to speed up the removal of containers that fell overboard from the MSC Chitra:

“This work has to be speeded up,” Rakesh Srivastava, joint secretary for ports at the Ministry of Shipping said in an interview after a meeting to discuss the recovery measures today. Salvagers are retrieving only four to six boxes a day of the 300 floating and submerged, he said.

According to this same report from Bloomberg, some 32 ships have been either stranded in the port or awaiting arrival. Some crude oil deliveries have been delayed as well as soybean meal exports. How are salvagers removing containers from the water? Via floating cranes:

Cranes mounted on barrages have moved closer to the sinking ship to collect falling or floating containers. MSC Chitra started sinking after it collided with another vessel MV Khalijia on Saturday.

Some carriers are already planning contingencies to route around Mumbai temporarily for India import and export cargo. You should check with your logistics service provider or carrier for their current plans on routing import/export containers from India. Below is a map of alternate port services to Mumbai and a tentative list of the carriers that already have services there (click for larger view):

Potential contingency ports for Mumbai - CLICK FOR LARGER VIEW

Pipavav – called by Maersk Line, NYK Line, UASC, Hanjin, K-Line, Hyundai, MOL

Mundra – called by APL, MSC, Hapag Lloyd, NYK Line, CMA-CGM, Zim Line

Above is just a tentative list, I may have missed a carrier or two. I know from my own contacts that Maersk Line is considering discharging Mumbai cargo at Pipavav and will make a decision soon on how they will handle export cargo. APL is considering routing U.S. East Coast cargo via Mundra. In both cases, the carriers will have to sort out the rail connections to Mundra and Pipavav – no idea on whether they have plans to rail pending containers back from Mumbai over to Pipavav and Mundra.

My understanding is that no alternative exists yet for the U.S. West Coast for APL and Maersk as both carriers trans-ship from Mumbai/JNPT to Asia via feeder vessel for mother vessels calling the U.S. West Coast from Asia. I would assume that both of them could instead rail containers to Pipavav and Mundra and have feeder vessels call there instead of Mumbai, but I have not heard any news regarding this. Again, check with your respective logistics service providers and carriers.

“The traditional peak season may be melting away,” said Ben Hackett, founder of Hackett Associates, which produces the Port Tracker for the NRF.

The report said double-digit increases in June and July apparently were swollen by backlogs that developed earlier this year when carriers moved slowly to reactivate ships they idled during the recession.

“With many retailers appearing to bring merchandise in early to avoid any further bottlenecks, July is likely to be the peak shipping month for 2010 rather than the traditional rush of holiday season merchandise in October,” the report said.

It’s important to note that this report tracks import container ARRIVALS at U.S. ports, not origin departures. The report is expecting July to have the highest container volume at 1.38 million TEUs with August and September dropping slightly to 1.32 million TEUs each.

I’m going to disagree with their assessment of July being the highest volume month. Our sources in the market seem to indicate that the last two weeks of August and first two weeks of September could likely be the busiest, and challenging, weeks for shipments departing Asia. That would mean containers arriving mostly in September for U.S. ports. In addition, equipment and space out of China is becoming increasingly difficult in August, not easier. This is particularly true for vessel bookings post August 15th. On top of this, multiple container lines, especially Maersk, are having equipment shortages, particularly acute in South China. Thus, I believe that import container volume will be heaviest in September, not July, and that August is already looking to be quite heavy as well.

I do agree that the container lines may have gotten a little greedy and ahead of themselves with their never-ending rate increases. I think the peak season will soften sooner and more rapidly than the container line industry thinks. All this talk of non-expiring PSS or PSS with expiration dates of Feb/Mar/Apr of next year may collapse if Nov/Dec comes along and volumes drop. The level of retail sales simply does not support the current trend of heavy double digit increases in volume – at some point, inventory levels will stabilize or companies may find out they ordered too much and volumes will stabilize or even come down. While carriers have been largely allocating vessels to the profitable Asia-Europe trade lanes, eventually more capacity will be coming to the Trans-Pacific trade.

Chinese New Year, of course, could change everything, at least temporarily until the next contract season. But even Chinese New Year could be subdued if enough retailers have a weak Holiday season. I’m still on the fence as to whether we’ll experience a double-dip recession or even a worsening of the economy, but at the very best economic growth has slowed and I expect the latter half of the year, including the holiday season, to grow only moderately.

Bottom line, I think there’s still a lot of life left in the current Peak Season from Asia, especially China, that will see import container volumes go even higher in September. However, I have a hunch that the market will soften, and fairly quickly, sometime post-September.

2009 was certainly a bad year for carriers: Mr. Kolding cited a 29% drop in container rates that contributed to an estimated $20 billion dollars in industry losses for the year. Import volumes are currently up 13%, but retail sales have only increased by 1%, therefore the volume increases could be short lived once inventory restocking is over. Consumer confidence is up, but still below where it should be.

On the question of industry consolidation, he highlighted the fact that too many players are chasing the same pieces of the pie. Even Maersk Line, the giant in the industry, only controls a 15.8% market share and the top 10 carriers in terms of volume barely control 60% of the market. Despite this, he doesn’t think we’ll see any shipping lines go down due to the downturn or from acquisition. Meanwhile, rates on the trans-pacific trade lanes are break-even at best.

Somewhat surprisingly, he had some critical words for his own company and the liner industry as a whole regarding delivery reliability and overall service. I’m paraphrasing, but he said something to the effect of “Our delivery reliability is appalling as an industry; best in class is only 60%. If we could get to 95% reliability customers could reduce inventory buffer by 60%.” He also expressed support for one-click shipping, citing statistics that showed that they amend each BL at least once.

On the question of slow steaming and the ever larger containerships entering the market, he insisted slow steaming was here to stay; partly as an environmental initiative and partly to save on bunker costs. As for the mega ships, he expects the trend for bigger ships to continue. “There is no reverse in the development of bigger vessels”, he said and reported that the majority of the vessels being laid up are the smaller, older ships: virtually all of the larger, more economical ships, are all in service.

Within a few hours after the Constitution Court dissolved People Power Party, People’s Alliance for Democracy, which had led seizures of the Government House and two Bangkok airports, declared an end to their demonstrations.

“We have won a victory and achieved our aims,” media mogul and PAD founder Sondhi Limthongkul said, reading a statement to reporters.

Cargo and military flights have resumed as of today, so that’s good for the trade community. However, passenger flights remain grounded and previous reports from authorities in Thailand indicated it would take some time before the airport was fully operational again. That being said, I imagine they will work quickly and most likely allow some planes to start ferrying long-stuck tourists out of Thailand.

Re: Threat of seaports closure: Obviously since the PAD has announced that they will end all protests there is no longer a threat of closure to the seaports. However, the PAD has indicated that they will protest again should the now ex-PPP (People Power Party) come back to power again.

I did hear back from my carrier contacts in Thailand. They both indicated that the PAD threatened to seize the seaports only if they were attacked at the airports. They also emphasized that this was more rumor than fact, despite news reports of a PAD spokesperson threatening the seaports. Currently all ports are operating as normal and they do not expect any disruption to operations.

Update – 12-1-2008, 23:15 PST: Breaking development – the Constitution Court of Thailand has dissolved the ruling People Power Party (PPP) and banned the executive board members from politics for 5 years. This means the current Prime Minister, Somchai Wongsawat, must step down. Hat tip to blogger Thailand Jumped the Shark, who links to this piece from Bloomberg:

Crowds at Suvarnabhumi Airport, which has been occupied for eight days by anti-government protesters demanding Somchai’s resignation, erupted in cheers after the ruling was announced. Somchai is in Chiang Mai attending a cabinet meeting.

One of the many goals of the PAD (anti-government protesters) has been the dissolution of the ruling PPP and the resignation of Somchai. This move by the court was widely predicted, since the members of the court were picked by the military government in power after the coup of 2006. It remains to be seen whether the PAD will pack up and leave or continue to stay at the airports.

Update – 12-1-2008, 17:30 PST: Here are two separate reports fresh from the Bangkok Post about the economic toll the closing of the airports is doing to Thailand.

First, orchid exporters say their losses could be as high as THB 800 million (roughly USD 23 million) if the Suvarnabhumi Airport remains closed through December 10th:

Suwan Hiranworawuttikul, president of the Royal Horticulture Association of Thailand, said orchid growers were losing between 50 million and 100 million baht a day because their flowers cannot be shipped out of Suvarnabhumi Airport.

“Orchid demand peaks in December and about 20-30% of orchid sales come from this period. Moreover, orchid prices during the peak season are about 300% higher than in normal periods,” he said.

Thailand each year exports orchids worth four billion baht and market demand has been rising by an average of 20% a year. The busiest time of the year for shipping orchids abroad by air is between Dec 10 and 21.

Basically, the orchid export industry is being ruined. And as the article points out, it’s just a matter of time before overseas buyers look to other countries instead of Thailand. Once that happens, unless the quality and service is vastly inferior to Thailand’s, it will be some time before that business returns to Thailand.

In another report the Transport Minister claims that they can get the cargo terminal up and running again by tomorrow:

He also stressed that three related agencies – Airports of Thailand (AoT), the Civil Aviation Department and the Customs Department – were told to be ready to start operations in two days.

He said that King Kaew Road had not yet been blocked by protesters and police officers needed to be stationed there as soon as possible, adding that police would take responsibility to protect the road from the PAD and ensure a clear path for cargo.

The Thai Airfreight Forwarders Association (Tafa) asked the Department of Civil Aviation yesterday to co-ordinate with AoT to allow freighters to land at Suvarnabhumi. It also asked the government to rent aircraft from neighbouring countries to serve its temporary needs.

The PAD seized both Bangkok airports last Tuesday. The damages to the Thai economy to date are estimated to have been at least three billion baht a day in lost shipment value and opportunities.

I say don’t hold your breath – I’d be surprised if this happened tomorrow, if at all. The government, for all intents and purposes, is in exile up north in Chiang Mai and is largely ineffectual. Neither the police nor the military prevented the PAD (anti-government protesters) from taking over the airport and shutting down flights. Not to mention that it serves PAD interests to continue to maintain control over the airport and prevent cargo operations from returning to normal. They might be convinced to allow “emergency” cargo shipments, such as medicines, to be ferried in and out under their supervision, but allowing police and customs officials to re-enter and take control of a key part of the airport? I highly doubt it.

Update – 12-1-2008: Protesters threaten to seize sea ports.
The news is coming fast and furious regarding the ongoing political strife in Thailand. There’s too much to link and excerpt to, but needless to say the airports are still shut down; perishable and high-value exporters are getting killed since they can’t air freight anything out of Bangkok directly. Perishables traders are being especially hurt since they can’t utilize the cold storage facilities at Suvarnabhumi Airport and simply can’t get product out. I’ve read reports that even if the airport siege was lifted immediately and they were allowed to get back to business it would take a minimum of a week just to get the IT systems tested and back online, not to mention that there are reports that some of the protesters have wrecked equipment.

But the worst news I have heard yet for the trade community comes buried in this lengthy article from The Nation newspaper in Thailand, where the PAD (anti-government protesters) have threatened to seize the Eastern sea ports, where the vast majority of sea-borne trade in and out of Thailand is handled.

The PAD may also try to seize seaports on the Eastern Seaboard if the takeover of the airports fails to force the premier out of office, Suthi Atchasai, a PAD leader from the East, told protesters at Suvarnabhumi yesterday.

If this happens Thailand will truly be cut off from the world. While the closing of the airports is a major blow to their economy, the vast majority of trade to and from Thailand is conducted by sea. Seizing and shutting down the major sea ports to the country will literally strangle trade and choke the country as goods will be unable to enter or exit the country. The situation on the ground is constantly changing and this is just a threat at this point – so take it with a grain of salt – but considering these are the same people who have managed to seize and shut down both major airports, it’s not unrealistic to think it could happen. I’ve reached out to a couple of my contacts in the shipping line industry as well as one of the major consolidators there to see what their take on the situation is. Once I have an answer I’ll report more tomorrow.

Original Post:

And with it’s closure, these thugs (because that’s exactly what they are) have assured Thailand’s economic destruction. Tourism is one of the biggest industries in Thailand, employing roughly a million people and accounting for 6% of the economy, according to this report from CNN. The airport these protesters have shut down is the still fairly new international gateway to Thailand, the giant Suvarnabhumi Airport, which handles 45 million passengers and three million tons of cargo per year, according to the same report from CNN. 370 flights a day normally go through Suvarnabhumi Airport, all of which are now stopped.

Best way to tarnish your country’s image, scare off current and potential investors, crimp international trade, kill your tourism industry, and completely obliterate any hope for an economic recovery during the impending global economic slowdown? Try storming the main international gateway for your country and shutting it down, stranding thousands of economically valuable tourists and international businessmen making front page news worldwide and earning travel warnings from major trade partners and tourist origin countries during the peak tourism season which runs from October to February. Congratulations, idiots, you’ve succeeded!

The English language newspaper Bangkok Post issues an editorial critical of the protesters’ (known as the PAD) move to shut down the airport.

Beyond the day’s immediate chaos, the impact of the PAD’s reckless action on the country’s tourism industry will be immense and difficult to rectify.

Even before the PAD attempted its boneheaded move to partially block access to the civil airport yesterday, up to 14 countries had already issued advisories warning their citizens to avoid non-essential travel to Thailand, and to exercise caution if they do visit.

According to Apichart Sankary, president of the Association of Thai Travel Agents, the protracted political tension is estimated to be costing the country 400 million baht each day in lost tourist revenue.

The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) has a similarly gloomy story to tell.

Due to the higher cost of travelling and our domestic disturbance, foreign tourist arrivals were down 16.5% while the average rate of occupancy at hotels around the country dropped to 45%.

Tourism-related revenue accounts for about 6% of the national economy, and had been forecast to reach about 700 billion baht this year – a goal that is unlikely to be met now.

Some of the countries that have issued travel warnings to stay away from Thailand: The Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore, UK, China, Japan, France, New Zealand, and Australia.

The BBC has reports on UK citizens stuck at the airport, including one traveler who said that the protesters were checking luggage at gunpoint.

Meanwhile, authorities and the Tourism Authority of Thailand are taking responsibility to evacuate the thousands of tourists from the airport and put them up in neighboring hotels.

Thai authorities evacuated about 3,000 tourists from Bangkok’s international airport, more than 15 hours after anti-government protesters seized its main terminal, forcing the airport’s closure.

“The airport is just a scene of chaos,” said John Watson, chief executive officer of Diethelm Travel Group in Bangkok, Thailand’s biggest inbound tour operator. “Communication has basically broken down. Passengers are feeling very intimidated seeing people walking by with masks, knives, wooden clubs and iron bars.”

The Economic Times from India says Thailand will be hard pressed to meet their USD 17 billion target for tourism in 2008. And this report from the Bangkok Post says the latest events could push many tourist operators into bankruptcy, adding further pressure to the economy:

The latest tensions could force many operators into bankruptcy, coming just weeks before the peak of the tourist season over the year-end holidays.

Apichart Sankary, president of the Association of Thai Travel Agents (ATTA), said the PAD protest Tuesday would have a massive impact on the industry.

“Don’t think that the Thai tourism business will grow next year. It’s dying now because of the political problems. In the best case, we might just see flat growth,” Mr Apichart said.

Another tourism expert said the attempts by the PAD to close Suvarnabhumi airport reflected the “lawless society” in Thailand.

“Do you know when the country’s image is destroyed, it’s very difficult to revive it in a short period? What does Thai hospitality look like now, when there are clashes and violence inside the country?” he said.

Bloomberg says that the Thailand Stock Index rose on perceptions that the chaos may end soon, but ends with the troubling news that hotel and resort operators are falling.

Forbes points out the obvious, that the urban support protesters have generally enjoyed may disappear as the economy continues to suffer amidst the global downturn.

But “in Bangkok, the middle classes are politically very, very fickle,” and with the weakening bhat and rising job losses, they may be increasingly worried about the economic impact of the instability, said Michael Montesano, professor in Southeast Asian politics at the National University of Singapore. Popular support could shift toward harsher expedients by soldiers and police to bring to an end the airport occupation and demonstrations in the capital. “One of the reactions of the Thai middle classes to economic insecurity is to be very intolerant of disorder and to be willing to tolerate fairly extreme measures against the disorder,” Montesano noted.

Asia Sentinel labels the protesters “fascist thugs” and openly questions whether they have had help from the Thai military, who should be providing security to the airport and to international travelers.

How did the PAD thugs manage to seize Bangkok International Airport? Airports are supposed to be high security areas. Thai airports are controlled by the Thai military. It is obvious that the Thai military, who staged an illegal coup in 2006, have quietly supported the PAD’s actions. It is obvious that the military is unwilling to provide basic security to air travelers and air crew. But they are happy to rake in huge salaries associated with their control of the Airports Authority. Foreign governments and airlines should reconsider whether the authorities in Thailand are willing to provide international standards of safety and security.

For the best blogosphere coverage on the crisis, at least in my opinion, check out Bangkok Pundit. Just keep scrolling.

Weekly carload freight, which does not include intermodal data was 309,099 cars, down 9.1 percent from the same timeframe last year. And carload freight loadings were down 6.5 percent in the West and 12.8 percent in the East.

Intermodal loadings, which are not included in carload data, totaled 225,375 trailers or containers, down 7.9 percent compared to the same timeframe a year ago. Trailer volume was down 11.7 percent, and container volume decreased 6.9 percent.

While Vietnam is forecasting lower export and import growth for 2009, it’s important to note that it’s still solidly in the double digits. However, they expect their trade deficit to slightly widen as well:

Vietnam’s trade deficit is expected to widen to US$19.9 billion next year from US$19 billion this year as growth in both imports and exports slow sharply from current rates, a government trade report said.

Hanoi has been striving to boost exports and curb the import of luxury goods such as cars and mobile phones to help limit the trade deficit to below US$20 billion.

Growth in exports is expected to slow to 18 per cent in 2009 from an estimated 32 per cent in 2008, while growth in imports is seen slowing to 15 per cent from 31.8 per cent this year.